TY  - JOUR
TI  - Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in Models With a Single Capital Stock.
AB  - Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which  strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future  levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary as well as sufficient conditions  that allow us to characterise Markov perfect Nash equilibria for these games. These  conditions can be translated into an auxiliary system of ordinary differential equations  that helps us to explore stability, continuity and differentiability of these equilibria.  The techniques are used to derive detailed properties ofMarkov perfect Nash equilibria  for several games including voluntary investment in a public capital stock, the intertemporal  consumption of a reproductive asset and the pollution of a shallow lake.
DO  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0805-3
SP  - 585
EP  - 625
PY  - 2014-01-01
JO  - Economic Theory
AU  - Dockner, Engelbert 
AU  - Wagener, Florian 
ER -