TY  - JOUR
TI  - Bill-and-Keep vs. Cost-Based Access Pricing Revisited
AB  - We study network competition with two-part tariffs and termination-based price discrimination in the presence of call externalities. We show that both the collusive and the welfare-maximizing access charges fall below marginal cost. Moreover, bill-and-keep arrangements are welfare improving compared with cost-based access pricing.
DO  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.003
SP  - 107
EP  - 112
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.003
PY  - 2005-01-01
JO  - Economics Letters
AU  - Berger, Ulrich 
ER -