Quotation Emeric, Henry, Louis-Sidois, Charles. 2020. Voting and contributing when the group is watching. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 12 (3), 246-276.


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Abstract

Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We characterize the socially optimal level of sanctions to be submitted to a vote by the social planner and discuss optimal voting rules.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation External
Type of publication Journal article
Journal American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Citation Index SSCI
WU-Journal-Rating new FIN-A, VW-A, WH-B
Language English
Title Voting and contributing when the group is watching
Volume 12
Number 3
Year 2020
Page from 246
Page to 276
URL https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343369214_Voting_and_Contributing_when_the_Group_Is_Watching
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3057239
Open Access N

Associations

People
Louis-Sidois, Charles (Details)
External
Emeric, Henry (Sciences Po, France)
Organization
Department of Economics (Berger) (Details)
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