Quotation Ambrus, Attila, Greiner, Ben. 2019. Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability. Journal of Public Economics. 178


RIS


BibTeX

Abstract

In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally compare the institution of democratic punishment, where members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, with individual peer-to-peer and dictatorial punishment institutions. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions. A comparison with dictatorial punishment suggests that the effect relative to traditional peer-to-peer punishment primarily works by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member's contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others.

Tags

Press 'enter' for creating the tag

Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Journal of Public Economics
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new FIN-A, INF-A, MAN-A, STRAT-A, VW-A, WH-A
Language English
Title Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability
Volume 178
Year 2019
Reviewed? Y
URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272719301148
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104053
Open Access N

Associations

People
Greiner, Ben (Details)
External
Ambrus, Attila (Duke University, United States/USA)
Organization
Institute for Markets and Strategy IN (Details)
Competence Center for Experimental Research WE (Details)
Research areas (Ă–STAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
5307 Business and management economics (Details)
Google Scholar: Search