Quotation Greiner, Ben, Grimm, Christine. 2018. Bargaining, Asymmetric information and Strategic Communication. ESA Asia Pacific Conference, Brisbane, Australien, 07.02.-09.02.




In an Ultimatum Game context, we experimentally examine the strategic choice of communication with different reliability and its effects on efficiency and payoff distributions. We replicate previous findings that asymmetric information results in efficiency losses, and how that these losses affect both the informed and the uninformed parties. Communication leads to an improvement of the situation. However, reliable communication does not reach its full potential while cheap-talk communication lso has an impact. Communication effects are asymmetric in that mostly proposers benefit from communication, be they informed or uninformed.


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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Paper presented at an academic conference or symposium
Language English
Title Bargaining, Asymmetric information and Strategic Communication
Event ESA Asia Pacific Conference
Year 2018
Date 07.02.-09.02.
Country Australia
Location Brisbane
URL https://research.qut.edu.au/qube/2018-asia-pacific-economic-science-association-7-9-february/


Greiner, Ben (Details)
Grimm, Christine (Details)
Institute for Markets and Strategy IN (Details)
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