Quotation Berger, Ulrich. 2019. Reputation and the evolution of private property rights. Workshop on Evolutionary Game Theory, Vienna, Österreich, 04.10.




Private property rights existed long before formal laws and institutional rights had been established. They have been explained as an equilibrium of the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game borrowed from biological models of animal territoriality. But in these models so-called anti-private-property equilibria exist which are not observed in the real world. We suggest a new evolutionary game-theoretic approach in which the interaction between the possessor of a valuable object and a potential taker is modeled as a symmetrized game of entry-deterrence where the taker has the additional option to obtain costly information on the possessor's past reactions to attempts of taking her object. Resisting these attempts, even though not credible in the one-shot interaction, allows possessors to gain a reputation of toughness which might deter such attempts in the future. For low information costs and under best-response dynamics the anti-private-property equilibrium's basin of attraction is quite small, while the private-property equilibrium component is asymptotically stable with a large basin of attraction. We use agent-based simulations to show that these results are qualitatively robust to the introduction of more realistic features of the underlying dynamics.


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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Paper presented at an academic conference or symposium
Language English
Title Reputation and the evolution of private property rights
Event Workshop on Evolutionary Game Theory
Year 2019
Date 04.10.
Country Austria
Location Vienna
URL https://homepage.univie.ac.at/josef.hofbauer/w19okt4.htm


Berger, Ulrich (Details)
Department of Economics (Berger) (Details)
Research areas (ÖSTAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
1104 Applied mathematics (Details)
1130 Biomathematics (Details)
1152 Game theory (Details)
5335 Political economic theory (Details)
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