Quotation Özkes, Ali, Sanver, Remzi, Laine, Jean. 2016. Hyper-stable social welfare functions. Social Choice and Welfare. 46 (1), 157-182.




We define a new consistency condition for neutral social welfare functions, called hyper-stability. A social welfare function (SWF) selects a weak order from a profile of linear orders over any finite set of alternatives. Each profile induces a profile of hyper-preferences, defined as linear orders over linear orders, in accordance with the betweenness criterion: the hyper-preference of some order P ranks order Q above order Q’ if the set of alternative pairs P and Q agree on contains the one P and Q’ agree on. A special sub-class of hyper-preferences satisfying betweenness is defined by using the Kemeny distance criterion. A neutral SWF is hyper-stable (resp. Kemeny-stable) if given any profile leading to the weak order R, at least one linear extension of R is ranked first when the SWF is applied to any hyper-preference profile induced by means of the betweenness (resp. Kemeny) criterion. We show that no scoring rule is hyper-stable, unless we restrict attention to the case of three alternatives. Moreover, no unanimous scoring rule is Kemeny-stable, while the transitive closure of the majority relation is hyper-stable.


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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation External
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Social Choice and Welfare
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new VW-D, WH-B
Language English
Title Hyper-stable social welfare functions
Volume 46
Number 1
Year 2016
Page from 157
Page to 182
Reviewed? Y
URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-015-0908-1
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0908-1
Open Access N


Özkes, Ali (Former researcher)
Laine, Jean (CNAM, France)
Sanver, Remzi (CNRS, France)
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