Quotation Kartal, Melis. 2018. Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 10 (1), 278-314.




New relationships are often plagued with uncertainty because one of the players has some private information about her "type." The reputation literature has shown that equilibria that reveal this private information typically involve breach of trust and conflict. But are these inevitable for equilibrium learning? I analyze self-enforcing relationships where one party is privately informed about her time preferences. I show that there always exist honest reputation equilibria, which fully reveal information and support cooperation without breach or conflict. I compare these to dishonest reputation equilibria from several perspectives. My results are applicable to a broad class of repeated games.


Press 'enter' for creating the tag

Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Citation Index SSCI
WU-Journal-Rating new FIN-A, VW-A, WH-B
Language English
Title Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences
Volume 10
Number 1
Year 2018
Page from 278
Page to 314
Reviewed? Y
URL https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/mic.20160178
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160178
Open Access N


Kartal, Melis (Details)
Department of Economics (Sausgruber) (Details)
Research areas (Ă–STAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
5325 Political economics (Details)
5351 Public economy (Details)
Google Scholar: Search