Quotation Berger, Ulrich. 2018. Co-action equilibrium fails to predict choices in mixed-strategy settings. Scientific Reports, 8, (751), 1-5.


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Abstract

Social projection is the tendency to project one’s own characteristics onto others. This phenomenon can potentially explain cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma experiments and other social dilemmas. The social projection hypothesis has recently been formalized for symmetric games as co-action equilibrium and for general games as consistent evidential equilibrium. These concepts have been proposed to predict choice behavior in experimental one-shot games. We test the predictions of the co-action equilibrium concept in a simple binary minimizer game experiment. We find no evidence of social projection.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Scientific Reports
Citation Index SCI
Language English
Title Co-action equilibrium fails to predict choices in mixed-strategy settings
Volume 8
Number 751
Year 2018
Page from 1
Page to 5
Reviewed? Y
URL https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-19085-0
DOI https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-19085-0
Open Access Y
Open Access Link https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-19085-0

Associations

People
Berger, Ulrich (Details)
Organization
Institute for Analytical Economics IN (Details)
Research areas (ÖSTAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
1104 Applied mathematics (Details)
1130 Biomathematics (Details)
1152 Game theory (Details)
5335 Political economic theory (Details)
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