Starjournal Quotation Betz, Regina, Greiner, Ben, Schweitzer, Sascha, Seifert, Stefan. 2017. Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-item Multi-unit Auctions: An Experimental Study. Economic Journal 127 (605), 351-371.


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Abstract

We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid versus closed clock versus open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous versus sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Economic Journal
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A+
Starjournal Y
Language English
Title Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-item Multi-unit Auctions: An Experimental Study
Volume 127
Number 605
Year 2017
Page from 351
Page to 371
Reviewed? Y
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12403

Associations

People
Greiner, Ben (Details)
External
Betz, Regina (Zürcher Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften (ZHAW), Switzerland)
Schweitzer, Sascha (Universität Bayreuth, Germany)
Seifert, Stefan (Universität Bayreuth, Germany)
Organization
Institute for Markets and Strategy IN (Details)
Competence Center for Experimental Research WE (Details)
Research areas (ÖSTAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
5307 Business and management economics (Details)
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