Quotation Ambrus, Attila, Greiner, Ben, Sastro, Anne. 2017. The Case for Nil Votes: Voter Behavior under Asymmetric Information in Compulsory and Voluntary Voting Systems. Journal of Public Economics 154, 34-48.


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Abstract

In an informational voting environment, we study the impact of an explicit nil vote option on the ballot when some voters are uninformed and face the swing voters curse. We postulate a simple model of strategic voting in which voters entertain heterogeneous thresholds on legitimacy of different voting actions. We predict that introducing a nil vote option reduces the number of uninformed and invalid votes, increasing expected welfare in both voluntary and compulsory voting. We test our model in a pen-and-paper laboratory experiment, and find that the predictions of the model hold in the data, for both voting systems.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Journal of Public Economics
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new FIN-A, INF-A, MAN-A, STRAT-A, VW-A, WH-A
Language English
Title The Case for Nil Votes: Voter Behavior under Asymmetric Information in Compulsory and Voluntary Voting Systems
Volume 154
Year 2017
Page from 34
Page to 48
Reviewed? Y
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272717301275
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.006
JEL C92; D72; D82

Associations

People
Greiner, Ben (Details)
External
Ambrus, Attila (Duke University, United States/USA)
Sastro, Anne (University of New South Wales, Australia)
Organization
Institute for Markets and Strategy IN (Details)
Competence Center for Experimental Research WE (Details)
Research areas (Ă–STAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
5307 Business and management economics (Details)
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