Starjournal Quotation Ambrus, Attila and Greiner, Ben. 2012. Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study. American Economic Review 102 (7): S. 3317-3332.


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Abstract

This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship. Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal American Economic Review
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A+
Starjournal Y
Language English
Title Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study
Volume 102
Number 7
Year 2012
Page from 3317
Page to 3332
Reviewed? Y
URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.7.3317
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3317
JEL C92, H41, K42

Associations

People
Greiner, Ben (Details)
External
Ambrus, Attila (Duke University, United States/USA)
Organization
Department of Strategy and Innovation DP (Details)
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