Quotation Weichenrieder, Alfons and Lipatov, Vilen . 2015. Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor. Social Choice and Welfare 45 (2): S. 457-477.




We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels and analyze a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry and increases labor supply of the less productive individuals. When one of the countries has a larger population, this effect is more pronounced in the smaller country. Tax competition generally tends to make societies more libertarian. Particular welfare effects for high and low skilled depend on the form of the government objective function.


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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Social Choice and Welfare
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new VW-D, WH-B
Language English
Title Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor
Volume 45
Number 2
Year 2015
Page from 457
Page to 477
URL http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-015-0898-z
DOI 10.1007/s00355-015-0898-z
JEL H21 F22 H71 D63


Weichenrieder, Alfons (Details)
Lipatov, Vilen (Goethe University Frankfurt Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Germany)
Research Institute for International Taxation FI (Details)
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