Quotation Feinberg, Robert and Husted, Thomas and Szücs, Florian. 2015. Does State Antitrust Enforcement Drive Establishment Exit? Journal of Competition Law and Economics 11 (1): S. 85-106.


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Abstract

While studies have examined motivations for businesses to exit and relocate in response to tax and regulatory policies at the state level, no previous work has considered whether U.S. state antitrust enforcement may have similar effects. The results of this article suggest that state-level antitrust (even when coordinated with the federal government) plays a fairly minor role in the exit decision of firms. Where it does play a role, the type of enforcement-anti-cartel vs. other measures-seems to determine the direction of impact. The economic significance of these effects is quite small, however, suggesting that state antitrust authorities need not worry about impacts on the broader economy in their enforcement decisions. Their focus should simply be on the merits of the particular case.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Journal of Competition Law and Economics
Citation Index SSCI
Language English
Title Does State Antitrust Enforcement Drive Establishment Exit?
Volume 11
Number 1
Year 2015
Page from 85
Page to 106
Reviewed? Y
URL http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/85.abstract?keytype=ref&ijkey=U3z9NpQjGBPJnr1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhu024

Associations

People
Szücs, Florian (Details)
External
Feinberg, Robert
Husted, Thomas
Organization
Department of Economics DP (Details)
Institute for Quantitative Economics IN (Details)
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