Clougherty, Joseph and Gugler, Klaus and Sørgard, Lars and Szücs, Florian. 2014. Cross-border mergers and domestic-firm wages: Integrating "spillover effects" and "bargaining effects" Journal of International Business Studies JIBS 45 (4): S. 450-470.

@ARTICLE{Clougherty2014,
title = {Cross-border mergers and domestic-firm wages: Integrating "spillover effects" and "bargaining effects"},
author = {Joseph Clougherty and Klaus Gugler and Lars Sørgard and Florian Szücs},
year = {2014},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2014.2},
volume = {45},
number = {4},
language = {EN},
pages = {450-470},
journal = {Journal of International Business Studies JIBS},
abstract = {Two literatures exist concerning cross-border merger activity's impact on domestic wages: one focusing on positive spillover effects; the other focusing on negative bargaining effects. Motivated by scarce theoretical scholarship spanning these literatures, we nest both mechanisms in a single conceptual framework. Considering the separate phenomena of inward and outward cross-border merger activity, our theoretical model generates three formal propositions: cross-border mergers can lead to wage increases via positive spillover effects; and negative bargaining effects are relatively more dominant when union market power is high, and when merging firms exhibit relatedness. Employing US firm-level panel data on wages combined with industry-level data on unionization and merger activity (covering 1989-2001), we find support for our propositions as inward and outward cross-border merger activity generate positive spillovers to wages, but are more likely to generate firm-level wage decreases when unionization rates are high and when cross-border merger activity is characterized as horizontal. Accordingly, future research on how cross-border mergers affect domestic wages should be mindful that both spillover and bargaining effects are at play, and that the degree of union market power and the relatedness of cross-border merger activity are critical in determining which effect dominates.},
}