Quotation Garrod, Neil, Kosi, Urska, Valentincic, Aljosa. 2008. Asset write-offs in the absence of agency problems. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 35 (3-4): S. 307-330.


RIS


BibTeX

Abstract

Using a large sample of small private companies, we show incremental influence of economic incentives over prescriptions from accounting standards by financial statement preparers in a code-law setting with high alignment between financial and tax reporting and no agency problems. Contrary to predictions from standards, more profitable companies are more likely to write-off and the write-off magnitude is greater, reflecting tax minimisation. Larger companies are more likely to write-off, but the magnitude decreases with size, reflecting increasing political costs due to greater visibility to tax authorities. Previous write-off patterns and magnitudes are persistent, reflecting institutional learning linked to regulatory changes.

Tags

Press 'enter' for creating the tag

Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new FIN-A, STRAT-B, VW-D, WH-B
Language English
Title Asset write-offs in the absence of agency problems
Volume 35
Number 3-4
Year 2008
Page from 307
Page to 330
URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1122933
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02078.x

Associations

People
Kosi, Urska (Former researcher)
External
Garrod, Neil
Valentincic, Aljosa
Organization
International Accounting Group AB (Details)
Google Scholar: Search