Paetzel, Fabian, Sausgruber, Rupert, Traub, Stefan. 2014. Social Preferences and Voting on Reform: An Experimental Study. European Economic Review 70, 36-50.
BibTeX
Abstract
Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting from a reform. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that anti-reform bias arising from uncertainty is mitigated by social preferences. We show that, paradoxically, many who stand to lose from reforms vote in favor because they value efficiency, while many who will potentially gain from reforms oppose them due to inequality aversion.
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| Status of publication | Published |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | WU |
| Type of publication | Journal article |
| Journal | European Economic Review |
| Citation Index | SSCI |
| WU Journalrating 2009 | A |
| WU-Journal-Rating new | FIN-A, VW-A, WH-B |
| Language | English |
| Title | Social Preferences and Voting on Reform: An Experimental Study |
| Volume | 70 |
| Year | 2014 |
| Page from | 36 |
| Page to | 50 |
| Reviewed? | Y |
| URL | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292114000531 |
| DOI | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.03.010 |
| JEL | C92, D72, D80 |
Associations
- Projects
- Experimental Investigations of Labor Markets
- People
- Sausgruber, Rupert (Details)
- External
- Paetzel, Fabian
- Traub, Stefan
- Organization
- Department of Economics (Sausgruber) (Details)
- Department of Economics DP (Details)
- Research Institute for International Taxation FI (Details)
- Research areas (ÖSTAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
- 5311 Public finance (Details)
- 5325 Political economics (Details)
- 5351 Public economy (Details)