Dockner, Engelbert, Wagener, Florian. 2014. Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in Models With a Single Capital Stock. Economic Theory 56 (3), 585-625.
BibTeX
Abstract
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary as well as sufficient conditions that allow us to characterise Markov perfect Nash equilibria for these games. These conditions can be translated into an auxiliary system of ordinary differential equations that helps us to explore stability, continuity and differentiability of these equilibria. The techniques are used to derive detailed properties ofMarkov perfect Nash equilibria for several games including voluntary investment in a public capital stock, the intertemporal consumption of a reproductive asset and the pollution of a shallow lake.
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Status of publication | Published |
---|---|
Affiliation | WU |
Type of publication | Journal article |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Citation Index | SSCI |
WU Journalrating 2009 | A |
WU-Journal-Rating new | FIN-A, VW-B, WH-B |
Language | English |
Title | Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in Models With a Single Capital Stock. |
Volume | 56 |
Number | 3 |
Year | 2014 |
Page from | 585 |
Page to | 625 |
Reviewed? | Y |
DOI | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0805-3 |
Associations
- People
- Dockner, Engelbert (Details)
- External
- Wagener, Florian (Universität Amsterdam, Netherlands)
- Organization
- Institute for Finance, Banking and Insurance IN (Details)
- Research Institute for Capital Markets FI (Details)