Quotation Berger, Ulrich. 2011. Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 72 (1), 30-37.




Cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mechanism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is one such mechanism. Assessing an individual's reputation requires first-order information, i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior, as it is utilized under image scoring. But there seems to be an agreement that in order to successfully stabilize cooperation, higher-order information is necessary, i.e. knowledge of others' previous reputations. We show here that such a conclusion might have been premature. Tolerant scoring, a first-order assessment rule with built-in tolerance against single defections, can lead a society to stable cooperation.


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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new FIN-A, VW-A, WH-B
Language English
Title Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
Volume 72
Number 1
Year 2011
Page from 30
Page to 37
Reviewed? Y
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.009
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.009


Berger, Ulrich (Details)
Department of Economics (Berger) (Details)
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