Quotation Fellner, Gerlinde, Sausgruber, Rupert, Traxler, Christian. 2009. Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2787.


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Abstract

We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Working/discussion paper, preprint
Language English
Title Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information
Title of whole publication CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2787
Year 2009
URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1468344

Associations

People
Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde (Details)
External
Sausgruber, Rupert (University of Innsbruck, Austria)
Traxler, Christian (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Germany)
Organization
Department of Economics (Weiss) (Details)
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