De Silva, Hannelore and Hauert, Christoph and Traulsen, Arne and Sigmund, Karl. 2010. Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 20 (2), 203-217.

RIS

@ARTICLE{De Silva2010,
title = {Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism},
author = {Hannelore De Silva and Christoph Hauert and Arne Traulsen and Karl Sigmund},
year = {2010},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8},
url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8},
volume = {20},
number = {2},
language = {EN},
pages = {203-217},
journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
abstract = {Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result - cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary - holds even in the case of 'strong altruism', when the benefits of a player's contribution are reaped by the other participants only.},
}