De Silva, Hannelore and Hauert, Christoph and Traulsen, Arne and Sigmund, Karl. 2010. Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 20 (2), 203-217.
BibTeX
Abstract
Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result - cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary - holds even in the case of 'strong altruism', when the benefits of a player's contribution are reaped by the other participants only.
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Status of publication | Published |
---|---|
Affiliation | WU |
Type of publication | Journal article |
Journal | Journal of Evolutionary Economics |
Citation Index | SSCI |
WU Journalrating 2009 | A |
WU-Journal-Rating new | VW-D |
Language | English |
Title | Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism |
Volume | 20 |
Number | 2 |
Year | 2010 |
Page from | 203 |
Page to | 217 |
Reviewed? | Y |
URL | http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8 |
DOI | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8 |
Associations
- People
- De Silva, Hannelore (Details)
- External
- Hauert, Christoph (UBC Vancouver, Canada)
- Sigmund, Karl (Uni Wien, Austria)
- Traulsen, Arne (Max Planck Institut Plön, Germany)