Quotation Berger, Ulrich. 2008. An evolutionarily stable scoring rule for indirect reciprocity. Miniworkshop on Evolutionary Game Theory, University of Vienna, Österreich, 01.10..




Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism which might provide a solution to the puzzle of how cooperation has evolved. Image scoring is a simple first-order assessment rule which bases an individual's reputation only on its past behavior. If reputation is binary (either "Good" or "Bad"), then conditional cooperation is evolutionarily stable under some higher-order assessment rules, but not under image scoring, which has led to a dismissal of the scoring rule. Here we show that introducing "Neutral" alongside Good and Bad types allows conditional cooperation to persist under image scoring.


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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Paper presented at an academic conference or symposium
Language English
Title An evolutionarily stable scoring rule for indirect reciprocity
Event Miniworkshop on Evolutionary Game Theory
Year 2008
Date 01.10.
Country Austria
Location University of Vienna
URL http://homepage.univie.ac.at/josef.hofbauer/1okt08.htm


Berger, Ulrich (Details)
Department of Economics (Berger) (Details)
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