Bhattacharya, Sudipto , Plank, Manfred, Strobl, Günter, Zechner, Josef. 2002. Bank Capital Regulation With Random Audits. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 S. 1301-1321.
BibTeX
Abstract
We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the banks asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholders/managers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the bank, and of the auditing frequency are examined. 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Tags
Press 'enter' for creating the tagPublication's profile
| Status of publication | Published |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | WU |
| Type of publication | Journal article |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control |
| Citation Index | SSCI |
| WU Journalrating 2009 | A |
| WU-Journal-Rating new | FIN-A, INF-A, STRAT-A, VW-B, WH-A |
| Language | English |
| Title | Bank Capital Regulation With Random Audits |
| Volume | 26 |
| Year | 2002 |
| Page from | 1301 |
| Page to | 1321 |
| Reviewed? | Y |
| DOI | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00045-8 |
Associations
- People
- Zechner, Josef (Details)
- External
- Bhattacharya, Sudipto (The London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom)
- Plank, Manfred (University of Applied Sciences, Germany)
- Strobl, Günter