Quotation Berger, Ulrich. 2002. Best Response Dynamics for Role Games. International Journal of Game Theory 30 (4), 527-538.


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Abstract

In a role game, players can condition their strategies on their player position in the base game. If the base game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, the set of Nash equilibria of the role game is globally asymptotically stable under the best response dynamics. If the base game is 2×2, then in the cyclic case the set of role game equilibria is a continuum. We identify a single equilibrium in this continuum that attracts all best response paths outside the continuum.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal International Journal of Game Theory
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new VW-D
Language English
Title Best Response Dynamics for Role Games
Volume 30
Number 4
Year 2002
Page from 527
Page to 538
Reviewed? Y
URL http://www.springerlink.com/content/pagl1ew3rc7axn3p/fulltext.pdf
DOI dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820200096

Associations

People
Berger, Ulrich (Details)
Organization
Institute for Analytical Economics IN (Details)
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