Quotation Berger, Ulrich. 2005. Bill-and-Keep vs. Cost-Based Access Pricing Revisited. Economics Letters 86 (1), 107-112.


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Abstract

We study network competition with two-part tariffs and termination-based price discrimination in the presence of call externalities. We show that both the collusive and the welfare-maximizing access charges fall below marginal cost. Moreover, bill-and-keep arrangements are welfare improving compared with cost-based access pricing.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Economics Letters
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new FIN-A, STRAT-B, VW-B, WH-B
Language English
Title Bill-and-Keep vs. Cost-Based Access Pricing Revisited
Volume 86
Number 1
Year 2005
Page from 107
Page to 112
Reviewed? Y
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.003
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.003

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Berger, Ulrich (Details)
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Institute for Analytical Economics IN (Details)
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