Starjournal Quotation Berger, Ulrich. 2008. Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited. Journal of Economic Theory 143 (1), 292-301.


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Abstract

Fictitious play is a classical learning process for games, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond games with a unique equilibrium, global convergence has only been claimed for games with diminishing returns [V. Krishna, Learning in games with strategic complementarities, HBS Working Paper 92-073, Harvard University, 1992]. This result remained unpublished, and it relies on a specific tie-breaking rule. Here we prove an extension of it by showing that the ordinal version of strategic complementarities suffices. The proof does not rely on tie-breaking rules and provides some intuition for the result.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Journal of Economic Theory
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A+
Starjournal Y
Language English
Title Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited
Volume 143
Number 1
Year 2008
Page from 292
Page to 301
Reviewed? Y
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.007
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.007

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People
Berger, Ulrich (Details)
Organization
Institute for Analytical Economics IN (Details)
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