Quotation Berger, Ulrich. 2006. A Generalized Model of Best Response Adaptation. International Game Theory Review 8 (1), 45-66.




We present a generalized model of myopic best response adaptation in large populations. In asymmetric conflicts, individuals can be in the role of the row player or the column player. The idea that an individual's role need not be fixed is introduced explicitly in our model by a process of role switching. The best response dynamics, the symmetrized best response dynamics, and the continuous time fictitious play process are included as special cases. We show that the set of Nash equilibria is attracting for zero-sum games. Moreover, for any base game, convergence to a Nash equilibrium implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium on the Wright manifold in the role game.


Press 'enter' for creating the tag

Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal International Game Theory Review
Language German
Title A Generalized Model of Best Response Adaptation
Volume 8
Number 1
Year 2006
Page from 45
Page to 66
Reviewed? Y
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198906000783
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198906000783


Berger, Ulrich (Details)
Google Scholar: Search