Quotation Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, Lünser, Gabriele. 2014. Cooperation in local and global groups. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 108 364-373.




Multiple group memberships are the rule rather than the exception. Within a linear public good game, we experimentally investigate two possible factors that impact the decision to cooperate in a smaller, local or a larger, global group: diverging marginal per capita returns, resulting in different social returns, and social feedback information. If social returns are equal across groups, subjects prefer to contribute to the local group that offers social information on individual contributions. An increase of the social return in the global group initially attracts more contributions, but this tendency quickly unravels in favor of cooperation in the local group. Cooperation in the global public good can only be sustained if contributions of global group members can be observed. We thus identify social feedback information as a key factor for institutional design to foster cooperation.


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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation External
Type of publication Journal article
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new FIN-A, STRAT-A, VW-B, WH-A
Language English
Title Cooperation in local and global groups
Volume 108
Year 2014
Page from 364
Page to 373
Reviewed? Y
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.02.007
Open Access N


Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde (Details)
Lünser, Gabriele (Private scholar, Germany)
Research areas (ÖSTAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
1152 Game theory (Details)
5335 Political economic theory (Details)
5511 Social psychology (Details)
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